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Abstract— InterCloud Computing is a new cloud paradigm 
designed to guarantee service quality or performance and 
availability of on-demand resources. InterCloud enables Cloud 
interoperability by promoting the interworking of Cloud systems 
from different cloud providers using standard interfacing. 
Resource management in InterCloud, considered as an important 
functional requirement, has not attracted commensurate 
research attention. The focus of this paper is to propose a 
Software Cybernetic approach, in the form of an adaptive control 
framework, for efficient management of shared resources in 
peer-to-peer InterCloud computing. This research effort adopts 
cooperative game theory to model resource management in 
InterCloud. The space of cooperative arrangements (resource 
sharing) between the participant cloud systems is presented by 
using Integer Partitioning to characterise the worst case 
communication complexity in peer to peer InterCloud. 
Essentially, this paper presents an Integer partition based 
anytime algorithm as an optimal cost solution to the bi-objective 
optimisation problem in resource management; anchored 
principally on practical trade-off between the desired 
performance (quality of service) and communication complexity 
of collaborating resource clouds. 
Keywords—Software Cybernetics; Multi-objective optimisation; 
Adaptive control; Cooperative game theory; Resource management; 
InterCloud Computing. 
I.  INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND 
loud computing offers on-demand access to a shared pool 
of resources e.g. storage, processors, Virtual machines 
and network bandwidth. In today’s Cloud paradigm, 
Consumers request and utilise resources via services from 
monolithic Cloud systems (e.g. Amazon web services, 
Rackspace, Microsoft and Google). These Cloud service 
providers (CSPs) achieve economies of scale for shared 
resources by delivering their resources as a utility (similar to 
electric power, gas or water) in a pay-as-you-go manner. 
Although Cloud computing promises the illusion of infinite 
resources (Toosi et al., 2014), essentially, the ability of a 
single cloud system to handle requests for reserved resources 
is bounded by limits (Aoyama and Sakai, 2011). For Instance, 
the Google Prediction API (Google cloud platform, 2015) 
stipulates 2.5 GB is the maximum size of a text file data 
source for Google’s Machine learning-as-a-service. 
Furthermore, Conventional Cloud computing systems may be 
insufficient to support Internet of Things (IoT) or big data 
applications which produce and process vast amounts of data. 
Unexpected spikes in loads and service failures may overbear 
a cloud system leading to interrupted services or unreliability 
(Aoyama and Sakai, 2011; Toosi et al., 2014). Moreover, it is 
highly improbable for proprietary cloud infrastructure 
providers to establish data centers at all possible locations (e.g. 
North America, Europe, South-east Asia) to meet the low-
latency requirements of consumer applications. Consequently, 
it has become imperative to adapt distributed resources (across 
clouds) in response to load variations (Buyya et al., 2010). 
Cloud interoperability is largely seen as a panacea to most of 
the foreseeable problems of the current cloud model. 
However, it is worthwhile to note that interoperable clouds 
come with inherent challenges.  
Vendor lock-in, a situation in which consumers can’t 
easily migrate between vendors, is seen as one of the 
drawbacks of the extant cloud computing models (Armbrust et 
al., 2009). Vendor lock-in in Cloud computing arises as direct 
consequence of cloud non-compatibility or lack of 
interoperability. Cloud interoperability demands Cloud 
Providers cooperate by adopting and implementing standard 
protocols, components and interfaces for their proprietary 
resources (Toosi et al., 2014). In practice, Cloud 
interoperability can be enabled either though service brokering 
or by using standard communication interfaces (Chen and 
Doumeingts, 2003; Toosi et al., 2014). Leading provider-
centric Cloud interoperability scenarios include Hybrid 
Clouds, Cloud Federation and InterCloud or ‘cloud of clouds’ 
(Banafa, 2014). Hybrid-Cloud by definition is a composition 
of two or more cloud infrastructures (e.g. a private and public 
cloud), which often use Cloud bursting- the use of public 
cloud resources when the private clouds are inadequate. 
Although some experts opt to use InterCloud and Cloud 
Federation synonymously in their work, others prefer to 
differentiate between the two terms. Specifically, Cloud 
Federation uses a provider (vendor) specification of the 
standard interfaces whereas Inter-Clouds is based on open 
technology and future standards. The Global Inter-cloud 
technology forum (GICTF) defines InterCloud computing in 




guarantees performance and availability of each service, by 
allowing on-demand reassignment of resources and transfer of 
workload through interworking of cloud systems and use of 
standard interfaces. InterCloud can be classified generally into 
two broad groups: Volunteer federation and Multi-clouds 
(Grozev et al., 2012).  Volunteer federation is a situation 
whereby group of cloud providers willingly or voluntarily 
agree to cooperate and share or exchange their resources (e.g. 
governmental clouds) while Multi-cloud occurs when multiple 
clouds are used in aggregation by an application or its broker. 
Based on architecture, Volunteer federations can further be 
classified into peer to peer or centralised. In the Centralised 
paradigm, a central entity is responsible for facilitating 
resource allocation whereas for peer to peer architecture, 
negotiation and cooperation is carried out directly between 
participatory clouds. Although resource management in 
InterCloud is still a relatively novel concept, the GICTF in 
their whitepaper (GICTF, 2010), regard resource management 
as an important functional requirement for InterCloud. 
According to Aoyama and Sakai (2011), an implementation of 
resource management for InterCloud must include a unified 
way (e.g. standard interfaces) of managing various resource 
configurations for each service such as servers, storage units 
and networks. They suggest the aim of this function is to 
manage resource configurations necessary to prevent services 
from degradation or disaster. Moreover, to ensure the 
reliability of web-based or Cloud services requires the 
enforcement of a testing process (Bai et al, 2007).   
Software Cybernetics, described broadly in scope, is an 
area of research that explores the interplay between Software 
and control. Research in the field of Software Cybernetics is 
justified by new topics or theories that arise as a result of new 
control requirements, for example, quality of service (QoS) for 
Network Software (Cai et al, 2003).  In this paper, our 
research effort is aimed at proposing a Cybernetic framework, 
comprising autonomic components, for efficient resource 
management in peer to peer volunteer InterCloud. Because of 
interdependencies that may exist between different 
collaborating cloud systems (resource coalitions), resource 
management for peer to peer InterCloud is modeled as 
partition function game in positive and negative settings, 
henceforth denoted    +        − settings. In addition to 
performance of peer to peer federations in InterCloud, our 
study also considers communication complexity in order to 
minimise redundant message exchanges via standard 
interfacing. Minimising communication helps to save the 
operation cost and as a consequence increases throughput 
(efficiency) of the InterCloud computing environment. The 
main thrust of this paper then is to develop an anytime 
procedure to solve the coalition structure generation (CSG) 
problem of p2p InterCloud resource management in    + 
       − settings.  Anytime algorithms are ‘so called’ 
because they can be terminated at any point during execution 
and return a ‘good solution’. This class of algorithms record 
monotonic increments in the quality of the solution before 
termination. Another desirable property of our proposed 
anytime algorithm is search cost criterion. This is quite 
pragmatic for real world systems, as it would be most 
beneficial to improve the solution quality by searching paths 
of minimum cumulative cost. The rest of this paper is 
organised as follows. Sections II & III detail the building 
blocks of our model for resource management in InterCloud 
Computing. Section IV formulates the multi-criteria 
optimisation problem and outlines our proposed algorithmic 
solution. Conclusion and our future work is provided in 
section V. 
II. FRAMEWORK FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN PEER TO 
PEER INTER-CLOUD  
Forming coalitions is important for solving many 
distributed applications (e.g. ubiquitous computing) where 
adaptation to changing resources and environments is 
necessary (Li, 2007). Horling and Lesser (2004) specified the 
important characteristics of coalitions that distinguish them 
from other organisations. According to their specification, 
“Coalitions in general are goal-oriented and short-lived; they 
are formed with a purpose in mind and dissolve when that 
purpose no longer exists”.  Coalition formation process can 
generally be considered to include three main activities: (i) 
compute the value of every possible coalition that can be 
formed. (ii) Compute the set of disjoint coalitions that have 
maximum total utility. (iii) Determine the reward each 
member agent gets in a coalition (Rahwan, 2007). Note that, 
sharing the reward is not essential in cooperative games as 
players are mainly concerned with maximising social welfare.  
 
Figure. 1.  Peer to Peer InterCloud architecture – direct 
negotiation between 3 volunteer cloud systems. 
Formally, our effort models management of resources in 
peer-to-peer (p2p) InterCloud, shown in Figure 1, as a 
cooperative (coalition) game. Let the set   be the set of 
distinct (singleton) resource pools representing resources (e.g. 
VMs, storage, networks) from   participating cloud providers 
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{ 1,  2,  3, … ,   } in the Inter-cloud computing environment, 
i.e.   = { 1,  2,  3, … ,   }. Then by definition, a resource 
coalition   is defined as a subset of   (  ⊂  ). The set of all 
possible resource coalitions is given by 2 . By convention, we 
also talk of the empty set (∅) as a coalition, the empty 
coalition. The set   is also a resource coalition, called the 
grand resource coalition comprising resource pools from all   
cloud providers. To increase Cloud resource types or capacity, 
we propose cloud providers in peer to peer InterCloud 
collaborate via sharing resources (horizontal federation) and 
form resource coalitions. As such, the subset  i of  , called a 
feasible resource coalition is given as:   
  i = {  |  ⊆ {1, 2…  }}                    (1) 
The coalition structure generation (CSG) problem, an 
important activity of coalition formation, involves partitioning 
the set of players into exhaustive and disjoint coalitions (see 
(2) and (3)) so as to maximise social welfare (Sandholm et al, 
1999; Rahwan, 2007). More so, in a number of real world 
environments, there are significant externalities from coalition 
formation in which the performance of one coalition may be 
affected by the formation of another distinct coalition 
(Michalak, 2008). For instance, in a context such as 
purchasing Cloud resources, ad hoc coalition formation will 
need to allow for coalition externalities in as broad a sense as 
possible (Rahwan, 2009). Hence, characteristic function 
games (CFGs) would be considered inadequate to represent 
such environments. In contrast to CFGs, Partition form games 
(PFGs) enable a representation that accounts for externalities.  
As described by Hafalir (2007), a partition form game (PFG) 
has positive (or negative) externalities if a merger between 
two coalitions may improve (or worsen) the performance of 
other coalitions. 
A. Partition Form Games (PFGs) for resource management 
in peer to peer InterCloud 
A resource coalition structure or resource structure (  ) in 
peer to peer InterCloud is defined as a partition (comprising 
resource coalitions, see (1)) of A, that is,    = { 1,  2, … , 
  } ,  ℎ    1 ≤   ≤  ) , hence,  
Cn ≠ ∅,         n ∈ 1, 2…   and            (2) 
    ∩  ℎ = ∅,          , ℎ ∈ 1, 2…   and   ≠ ℎ                     (3) 
Mergers of resource coalitions in InterCloud may have a 
positive impact on the value of other resource coalitions in 
Inter-cloud especially when resource pools are degraded or 
experiencing major failures. On the other hand, the 
performance of resource coalitions could be hampered as a 
result of the increased cooperation (communication 
complexity) of other coalitions, particularly if resources are 
readily available and adequate. Consequently, PFG’s for 
resource management in peer to peer InterCloud can exhibit 
either positive or negative externalities.   
In games with externalities for resource management in 
InterCloud, the payoff (value) of a resource coalition may 
change as the resource coalition structure which contains it 
changes. This means that it is not generally possible to pre-
determine the reward of a resource coalition in a certain 
coalition structure without actually computing it in that 
specific structure. As a result, finding an optimal resource 
configuration (or resource structure) can only be guaranteed 
by searching through the entire search space of resource 
structures. This can easily be classified an NP-hard problem if 
the search space were too large to be fully searched (Guazzone 
et al, 2014; Rahwan, 2007). Consequently, our solution adopts 
the class of anytime algorithms to generate solutions that 
although not optimal, are guaranteed to be within a bound 
from the optimal, and is established by searching partial 
subsets of the space. Additionally, an optimal solution can be 
guaranteed with further search (if time permits). A Partition 
form game for resource management in Inter-Cloud consists 
of the set of resource pools   and a multi-valued partition 
function which takes as input, every feasible resource coalition 
structure   , and for every resource coalition ( ) in that 
structure, outputs a set-valued payoff that reflects the 
performance of the resource coalition in that structure. The 
set-valued payoff for a resource coalition represents the 
success rate of matching Cloud consumer’s request to 
resources, i.e. comprising the number of successful matches 
and number of request attempts, it achieves in a specific 
resource coalition structure. Furthermore, computing the 
performance of resource coalitions is carried out (in an 
efficient manner) using the distributed coalition value 
calculation (DCVC) algorithm as presented in Rahwan (2007). 
B. Resource Structure Graph   
In its simplest form, the solution to the resource structure 
generation problem can be described as a search in a coalition 
structure graph (Sandhlom et al, 1999), a graph in which every 
node represents a coalition structure. The resource structure 
graph for peer to peer Inter-cloud is based on a novel 
representation of the search space called Integer partition (IP) 
graph (Rahwan, 2012). Using this representation, every node 
(called provider or resource node) in the resource graph 
represents a subspace that comprises feasible resource 
coalition structures, nodes are categorised into    levels 
(partition spaces) denoted as   1,  2, … ,   . Partition space    
contains the resource structures comprising   resource 
coalitions. For instance, if the number of cloud providers or 
‘singleton’ resource coalitions in InterCloud is   = 6, then the 
search space is the set   of all integer partitions (partition 
spaces) of   is given as,  
   = { {6}, {3,3}, {2,4}, {1,5}{2,2,2}, {1,2,3}, {1,1,4}, 
{1,1,2,2}, {1,1,1,3}, {1,1,1,1,2}, {1,1,1,1,1,1}}                   (4)  
Definition:  A resource structure graph (or simply resource 
graph) is an Integer partition graph in which the provider 
nodes (subspaces) on each level are ordered in ascending or 
descending order of the maximum resource coalition size it 
contains (see Fig. 2). Arcs in the resource structure graph 
represents mergers (more communication between providers 
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using standard interfaces) of resource coalitions when 
followed upwards and splits of resource coalitions (less 
communication between providers using standard interfaces) 
when followed downwards. 
Figure. 2. Resource structure graph (or simply resource graph) 
for 6 resource Clouds (RCs). 
III. COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY IN PEER TO PEER 
INTERCLOUD COMPUTING   
We refer to each Cloud provider’s pool of resources in 
peer to peer InterCloud computing environment as a 
‘singleton’ resource coalition i.e. a Cloud with its own internal 
communication structure, when several ‘singleton’ resource 
coalitions agree to share or exchange computing resources 
(horizontal federation) they behave as if in symbiosis i.e. an 
autonomous Cloud can request resources from all other 
Clouds in the same resource coalition. Intuitively, each 
‘singleton’ resource cloud in a resource coalition of size   
maintains subscription(s) to each of the remaining   − 1 
resource clouds and exchange messages (communicate) via 
standard interfaces. Therefore, the worst case communication 
complexity between resource clouds in a resource coalition of 
size  is computed as  (  − 1) = 2 – .  
Lemma 1: For resource nodes arranged in ascending (likewise 
descending) order of resource coalition size for each partition 
space (level) of the resource graph, the leftmost (rightmost) 
provider nodes (subspaces) in each partition space     
communicate less via standard interfaces (worst case scenario) 
in comparison to the rightmost (leftmost) nodes or subspaces.      
Proof: If the maximum Resource coalition size of any leftmost 
(or rightmost) provider node in partition space   2   is   then 
the maximum Resource coalition size of its immediate 
rightmost (leftmost) sibling node, if any, is at most   + 1. 
Similarly, the minimum resource coalition size of the leftmost 
(rightmost) node is at most   and the minimum provider 
coalition size of its immediate rightmost (leftmost) sibling 
node is at most ( -1).   
Hence, we now compare (worst case scenario) the 
communication complexity of the resource coalitions in the 
leftmost (rightmost) resource node to its immediate rightmost 
(leftmost) neighbor in sub space  2,   hence, we have 2( 2 − 
 ) <   (  + 1) + (  − 1) (  − 2). Which implies, 2 2 − 
2  < ( 2 +  ) + ( 2 − 3  + 2) and 2 2 − 2  < 2 2 − 
2  + 2. This assertion is true for the base case i.e. sub space 
 2. We also need to prove that this inequality holds for any 
level (partition space)    (  > 2) in the resource structure 
graph by reducing the problem in partition space    to a base 
case problem (partition space  2). Generally speaking, we can 
prove this by looking closely at the pattern that arises in the 
partition spaces below  2 as illustrated in Fig. 3. The pair of 
leftmost (rightmost) resource nodes and some rightmost 
(leftmost) neighbor, if any, in Sub space  3, have one resource 
coalition of the same size in common, and in Sub space  4, 
they have two resource coalition sizes in common and so on.  
 
Figure. 3. Schematic representation for reducing resource 
nodes in level  ,   > 2 to nodes on level 2. 
Therefore, in partition space    (  > 2), comprising more 
than one provider node, the leftmost (rightmost) resource node 
and some rightmost (leftmost) neighbor, have   resource 
coalition sizes in common where         − 2 . We can reduce 
each pair of these nodes by removing the resource coalition 
sizes they have in common since theoretically these resource 
coalitions have the same communication complexity in the 
worst case. In conclusion, resource nodes extant in partition 
space    contain   resource coalitions and each pair of leftmost 
(rightmost) provider nodes and its immediate rightmost 
(leftmost) neighbor can be reduced (see Fig. 3) to Cloud nodes 
similar to those in partition space  2. 
Lemma 2:  In a resource graph, provider (resource) nodes in 
provider partition space    (  ≥ 1) on average have increased 
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communication in comparison (worst case analysis) to 
provider nodes in partition space   +1.     
Proof: In ascending (descending) order the rightmost 
(leftmost) provider nodes in each partition space communicate 
the most according to lemma 1. Specifically, partition spaces 
  +1 have a rightmost (leftmost) provider node of the form  
{1}  {1}{  − 1}, where   +   =       {1}  is   (  ≥0)
‘singleton’ resource coalitions, i.e.{1} {1} … ×  , then in 
partition space    the equivalent rightmost (leftmost) node has 
the form {1}  { }. These rightmost (leftmost) provider nodes 
contain resource coalitions that communicate the most 
(following the proof of lemma 1) in partition spaces   +1 and    
respectively. Hence, we perform the worst case comparison of 
the communication complexity as shown in Fig. 4 for provider 
nodes in partition spaces    and    +1 following lemma 2, we 
can say ( 2 −  ) > ( 2 − 3  + 3).   Since we are strictly 
dealing with integers, this implies   > 1, hence, the Inequality 
proves our assertion is true for rightmost (leftmost) provider 
nodes in all partition spaces. In addition, it can be shown 
graphically that the communication complexity of the leftmost 
(rightmost) provider node in space    is greater than leftmost 
(rightmost) node in partition space   +1. 
 
 
Figure. 4. Worst case analysis of the communication 
complexity in peer to peer (p2p) InterCloud. 
IV. MULTI-CRITERIA OPTIMISATION PROBLEM IN RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT FOR PEER TO PEER INTERCLOUD  
To accomplish our goal of finding the most effective and 
efficient deployment of resources across clouds and prevent a 
deterioration of InterCloud throughput, we need to employ a 
test process and make optimal decision in the presence of 
trade-off between the value (success rates) and communication 
complexity of resource structures in peer to peer Inter-cloud. 
The aim is then to find a Pareto optimal solution for the 
resource structure generation (or CSG) problem comprising 
the two prominent objectives (value or outcome of resource 
structures against communication complexity). Intuitively, a 
decision maker’s upmost preference for resource management 
would be performance (or value) of a resource structure over 
the complexity of message exchanges (or communication). 
These preferences must be captured in the solution process for 
the coalition structure generation problem. Accordingly, we 
apply a priori multi-criteria optimisation (MCO) method 
called lexicographic method, which assumes that objectives 
can be arranged in hierarchy of preference or importance (Jee 
et al, 2007). Formally, the lexicographic method for the 
coalition structure generation problem of resource 
management in peer to peer Inter-cloud consists of two single-
objective optimisation problems: 
  ∗ =         ℎ  (  )                      (5)   
 .  .      ∈    
ℎ  (  ) = ℎ ∗,      = 1…  ,   = 1…   − 1       = 2   
ℎ1 (  ) =         (  ) 
ℎ2 (  ) = 1/   (  )    
In applying lexicographic ordering (LO), we denote ℎ1 
(  ) and ℎ2 (  ) as the most preferred and least preferred 
objective functions respectively. Also, the optimal value(s) ℎ ∗ 
= arg max (ℎ  (  )) is the solution for the single objective 
function ℎ . Given the partition form game (PFG) for resource 
management in p2p InterCloud, consider a resource (or 
provider) coalition   and a resource coalition structure    in 
peer to peer inter-cloud.  We denote        ( ,   ) = 
{(      )  , (     )  } , the performance of resource coalition 
  in    , where (      )       (     )    is defined as the 
number of resolved consumer requests (successful) and the 
number of attempts respectively, achieved by resource 
coalition   in resource (coalition) structure   . Therefore, the 
highest priority objective function  ℎ1(  ) is computed as 
       (  ) = ∑ ∈          ( ,   ) = {∑ ∈  (      )  
 
, 
∑ ∈  (     )  } and the least priority ℎ2(  ) is the 
multiplicative inverse of  (  ) , a function which returns the 
resource structure’s communication complexity. 
A. IP Algorithm 
The IP algorithm (Rahwan, 2007) is based on an integer 
partition representation of the search space that groups 
resource structures into subspaces based on the sizes they 
contain. What is interesting about this representation is that, it 
is possible to establish bounds (upper and lower) on the 
outcome (performance) of the best resource structure in every 
subspace     of   ∈   . More precisely, let      and      be 
the maximum and average outcomes of resource coalitions of 
size   (  ≤  ). For all Integer partitions   ∈   , it is possible to 
compute the upper bound     = ∑ ∈      and lower bound 
    = ∑ ∈       respectively. Consequently, these bounds are 
used to guarantee worst case scenarios on the quality of the 
best resource structure found so far and also to prune 
unpromising subspaces.  As for the remaining subspaces, they 
are searched sequentially unless a value is found that is higher 
than the upper bound of other subspaces, in which case we 




B. IP+/- Partial search: Minimum search and worst case 
guarantees  
In a partition form game for resource management with 
positive and negative externalities, we perform minimum 
search to establish bound on the optimal resource 
configuration in peer to peer inter-cloud by observing the 
maximum (best) outcome of each resource coalition   in some 
resource coalition structure as conceptualised in Fig. 5. 
Specifically, if resource degradation is relatively high or 
common across Clouds (PFG
+
 setting), every Integer partition 
  :   ∈    ∶ | | ≤ 2 must be searched and the number of resource 
structures searched (or search cost) is 2 
−1
 with a worst case 
ratio bound   =  . On the other hand, if Clouds’ resource 
failure is low (PFG
-
 setting), It is necessary to search every 
partition   :   ∈ {[ ], [  − 1,1], [  − 2,1,1], … , [1,1, … ,1]}. 
Here, the number of resource coalition structures searched (or 
search cost) is 2 





 partial search for 10 resource clouds when 
Clouds experience high resource degradation (   + setting)  
 
C. IP+/- optimal cost anytime algorithm for further 
Search 
In this subsection we outline our anytime algorithm 
(uniform cost search) to improve the solution quality with 
further search. Although Rahwan et al (2012) anytime 
algorithm for reducing the ratio bound   with further search is 
cost effective, it minimises (using an integer solver) the search 
cost required to reduce the worst case ratio bound   by at least 
one in each iteration. Their method does not necessarily 
assume an ordered path of minimal cost.  This is because 
lowering the ratio bound   for subspaces of some cost which 
requires exploring a subspace of higher cost is not exactly cost 
optimal or cost efficient (see Fig. 6). As a solution, we 
developed a procedure for further search that determines the 
Pareto-frontier and is cost-centric, based on the cost of 
searching subspaces. The search cost or cost of searching an 
Integer partition is defined as the number of resource 
structures it contains. For instance: given n resource clouds  . . 
(Where   = 10), searching the subspace  represented by 
integer partition   = [4, 3, 3] incurs a cost  of 2100, equal 
to the number of constituting resource structures. Our 
algorithm’s prime idea is to search through the remaining 
subspaces, one after another, ordered by minimum path cost. 
 
Figure 6. Exploration of a node (with      = 45) to reduce   
(of a partition with      = 1) from 10    5 using IP+/- 
improving the ratio bound algorithm for 10 resource clouds in 
   +setting. 
 Basically, If we can afford the cost (time), our anytime 
algorithm uses priority queue as the data structure to find a 
cost efficient way to improve the solution quality (and lower 
the bound) by always searching a subset of resource structures 
with the least cumulative cost from the remaining subspaces. 
Figure 7 is an illustration (worst case) of the first three 
minimum cost paths (see callouts) chosen by the proposed 
algorithm for 10 resource clouds with positive externalities, 
integers are used to represent coalition sizes. At each path 
step, our procedure re-computes its search path, that is, the 
path comprising subspace(s) with the smallest cumulative 
search cost out of the remaining (unsearched) subspaces. 
Algorithm 1 presents our three step outline of the proposed 
anytime algorithm in sequel. 
Algorithm 1: IP
+/-
 optimal cost anytime algorithm (Uniform 
cost search)  
1. Perform IP Partial search for PFG 
 For negative externalities (PFG-): Search 
subspaces,  






 optimal cost further search algorithm for 10 
resource clouds when Clouds experience high resource 
degradation (   + setting)  
 
2.    If there is additional Cost(time) allowance, Continue 
with Uniform cost search or if the cost permits, 
minimum cost search the remaining subspaces 
(resource structures) represented by Integer partitions 
which involves in worst case not greater than: 
 For PFG+:    
 For PFG- : 
  
3. Return the best resource structure obtained thus far. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper has presented a Self-tuning framework for 
managing resource in InterCloud, an important and quite novel 
topic in InterCloud research literature. We have adequately 
modeled resource management for volunteer (p2p) InterCloud 
with partition function games in    +        − settings. 
Using the Integer Partition graph representation, we were able 
to define a new concept ‘resource structure graph’, in which 
nodes at each level of the IP graph must be ordered, in 
ascending or descending order of the maximum resource 
coalition size it contained. Interestingly, this representation 
enabled measurement of worst case communication 
complexity for any resource coalition of a specific size and 
any resource structure in peer to peer InterCloud. Accordingly, 
our research effort has proffered two lemmas (with proof) 
based on the worst case communication complexity of 
resource nodes in a resource structure graph. With this 
background, we were able to identify a multi-objective 
optimisation problem for resource management and describe 
its solution formally using a multi-criteria optimisation (MCO) 
method referred to as lexicographic ordering. Furthermore, we 
developed an IP-based anytime algorithm, based on uniform 
cost search, to solve the CSG problem. In future work, this 
research will pursue empirical evidence in    +        − 
settings to measure the efficiency of our proposed anytime 
algorithm in reducing the ratio bound and improving the 
solution quality.  
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